

ONE YEAR ON: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A YOUNG GOV POLL OF FOUR NATO STATES

Introduction by **Beatrice Fihn**

Nuclear weapons are the most destructive, inhumane and indiscriminate weapons ever created. Both in the scale of the devastation they cause, and in their uniquely persistent, spreading, genetically damaging radioactive fallout, they are unlike any other weapons. A single nuclear bomb could kill millions of people. The use of tens or hundreds of nuclear bombs would disrupt the global climate, causing widespread famine.

In the week of the first anniversary of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), this new YouGov polling commissioned by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has found an overwhelming rejection of nuclear weapons. This poll is conducted in the four EU countries that host US nuclear weapons: Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. The survey results show a clear rejection of nuclear weapons by those Europeans who are on the frontline of any nuclear attack: those hosting US weapons on their soil. Europeans are even more strongly in favour of an international ban of all nuclear weapons worldwide. The TPNW complements the prohibitions on biological and chemical weapons, land mines and cluster munitions, and reinforces various other legal instruments on nuclear weapons, including the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) of 1968.

Also, an overwhelming majority in the US nuclear weapons host nations is against companies in their country investing in nuclear weapons activities. Significant financial institutions, including Dutch pension fund (5th largest in the world) ABP, largest Belgian Bank KBC, and Deutsche Bank mentioned domestic and international circumstances, even clearly referring to the TPNW, as reasons to change their investment practices around nuclear weapons. The outcome of the survey clearly confirms the public disapproval of those companies still profiting from the production of immoral, destructive, inhumane and indiscriminate weapons.

On July 7, 2017, a majority of the world's countries decided to reject nuclear weapons when they adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Now the time has come for those countries that still possess or host nuclear weapons to take responsibility and act: they should fulfill their long overdue nuclear disarmament obligations. All responsible states should prohibit nuclear weapons by joining the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. By doing so, they would not only listen to their citizens, they would also fulfill their key responsibility: protect its populations from one of the worst atrocities on the basis of international human rights precepts.

Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)

Notes on methodology

Belgium and the Netherlands:

All survey data are provided by YouGov Deutschland GmbH. **1048** respondents participated in each national survey, which took place between the **18.06.2018** and the **20.06.2018**. The results were weighted and are representative for the Belgian and Dutch population (age 18+).

Germany:

All survey are provided by YouGov Deutschland GmbH. **2050** respondents participated in the survey, which took place between the **18.06.2018** and the **20.06.2018**. The results were weighted and are representative for the German population (age 18+).

Italy:

All survey data are provided by YouGov Deutschland GmbH. **1061** respondents participated in the survey, which took place between the **18.06.2018** and the **21.06.2018**. The results were weighted and are representative for the Italian population (age 18+).

1. European countries should remove nuclear weapons from their territory

1.1. Background

US nuclear weapons arrived in Europe in 1953, through bilateral “programs of cooperation” the United States arranged with Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the UK. During the Cold War these nuclear weapons were deployed in Europe to counter the conventional superiority of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.ⁱ These weapons are often referred to as ‘tactical’ or sub-strategic’ denoting their shorter-range capabilities compared to ‘strategic’ weapons with global reach. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union President George H.W. Bush implemented the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives that reduced the number of US nuclear weapons in Europe from 1.500 to 700.

Now, an estimated 150 US B61 nuclear weapons are deployed on European territory. These B61 gravity bombs are supposed to be delivered by US and by allied Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA), which have an estimated reach of approximately 1.350 km.ⁱⁱ European DCA are located in Kleine Brogel Airbase (Belgium), Volkel Airbase (Netherlands), Büchel Airbase (Germany), Ghedi & Aviano Airbases (Italy) and Incirlik Airbase (Turkey).ⁱⁱⁱ The deployment of US nuclear weapons in specific host nations is based on bilateral agreements between the host nation and the US. In this regard it should be noted that precedents exist for the removal of US nuclear weapons from European host nations. Greece removed US nuclear weapons in 2001^{iv}, while such weapons were also withdrawn from the United Kingdom in 2008.^v It has also been reported that some US nuclear weapons were removed from Germany around 2007.^{vi}

Efforts are underway for large-scale upgrades to the B61 nuclear gravity bomb that is deployed at six air force bases in Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey. Under this programme the US wants to consolidate the current five B61 variants into a single B61-12 weapon. Production of the B61-12 is expected to begin in 2020. Cost estimates of the B61-12 programme have more than doubled since 2010, to nearly 10 billion USD.^{vii} The B61-12 is expected to be replaced itself by the B61-13, for which development is scheduled to start in the late 2030s.^{viii}

In **Belgium** there is a broad political consensus to remove the US nuclear weapons from Kleine Brogel Airbase. In an April 2015 resolution, the Belgian parliament asked the government to *'take resolute steps towards nuclear disarmament, in the context of multilateral negotiations in which Belgium actively participates, to make the Belgian territory completely free of nuclear weapons.'* Previously, in 2013 members of parliament from N-VA, which is currently the biggest political party, called the continued presence of nuclear weapons in Kleine Brogel an *'anachronism'* and *'staggering'*.^{ix} Since 2010 political heavyweights like former Prime Ministers Verhofstadt, Dehaene and Letermé, former NATO Secretary-General Claes and former Foreign Minister Michel have publicly called for the removal of nuclear weapons from Belgian territory.

In **the Netherlands**, there has been broad political support for concrete national steps towards nuclear disarmament, including ending the Dutch nuclear task and the removal of the US nuclear weapons from Volkel Airbase. In 2013, two former Dutch prime ministers publicly confirmed the presence of nuclear weapons at Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands and revived the public debate on the US nuclear weapons in the Netherlands.^x In March 2014, Parliament adopted a motion calling upon the government to advocate, within the NATO-context, for the end of the Dutch nuclear task.^{xi} In April 2016 a large majority endorsed the proposal to disclose any secret agreements on the basis of which nuclear weapons were placed in the Netherlands.^{xii} There has also been broad parliamentary support for the request to use the momentum against nuclear weapon upgrades in Europe to boost global nuclear disarmament and the Parliament called on the government to reject its nuclear task in consultation with the United States.^{xiii} The current government coalition agreement (2017) includes a paragraph on nuclear disarmament, in which the Dutch government committed itself to "actively work for a nuclear weapon free world, within the framework of alliance obligations".^{xiv} In May 2018 a parliamentary motion was adopted calling on the government to come with a concrete national plan for this active approach. The motion was initiated by three coalition parties (CDA, D66 and ChristenUnie) and supported by almost all opposition parties.^{xv}

In **Germany** since 2010, at which time the German Bundestag passed a resolution^{xvi} seeking consensus in NATO for the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Germany, there has been significant rollback on this issue. Despite continued strong opposition from civil society to the presence of these nuclear weapons and their planned modernization, parliamentary resolutions calling for their withdrawal have been consistently voted down by the grand coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD). A cable published by Wikileaks shows that the German Chancellor never intended to fulfill their agreement with the then liberal coalition partner (FDP)^{xvii}. The SPD returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2013 and Frank-Walter Steinmeier declared in April 2015 that the pursuit of the goal of a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany would not be possible due to the conflict over Ukraine^{xviii}.

In **Italy**, confirmation of the (continued) presence of US nuclear weapons in two bases (Aviano and Ghedi) was obtained through a report from Federation of Atomic Scientists in 2005. The first parliamentary questions were asked of the centre-right Government that same year, and in later years were asked of centre-left Governments: the replies were always the same, following Nato's "do not confirm, do not deny" principle. In 2007-2008 signatures were collected to introduce legislation initiated by civil society: the legislation would have declared Italy a Nuclear-weapon-free country, but never found a sufficient parliamentary majority to table it. Meanwhile, two resolutions initiated by centre-left MPs working within European networks were adopted (promoted by Federica Mogherini), with broad-ranging majorities, underscoring the resolutions of the European Parliament and supporting the need to work towards the security of a world without nuclear weapons. Public opinion has never been properly polled, but there has always been a clear majority in favour of removing US nuclear weapons from Italian bases.


1.2. What do citizens think?

Public opinion in all four surveyed host nations is strongly in favor of the removal of US nuclear weapons from their countries. Support for a removal of US nuclear weapons is most outspoken in Germany and Italy. In **Germany** 70 % want them removed, while 65 % of **Italians** would prefer withdrawal.

In **Belgium**, 57 % of respondents think they should be removed. In the **Netherlands**, 56 % of those asked want the removal of US nuclear weapons.

QUESTION 1: There are nuclear weapons that are currently stationed in your country. Do you think US nuclear weapons should be removed from your country's territory or should they stay?

	They should stay	They should be removed	Don't know / prefer not to answer
Belgium	21%	57%	22%
Netherlands	25%	56%	19%
Germany	16%	70%	14%
Italy	18%	65%	18%



2. European countries should sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

2.1. Background

On July 7, 2017 122 UN member states adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty prohibits nations from developing, testing, producing, manufacturing, transferring, possessing, stockpiling, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons. It also prohibits them from assisting, encouraging or inducing anyone to engage in any of those activities. In addition, nations must not allow nuclear weapons to be stationed or deployed on their territory.

The Treaty is open for all countries to join and includes provisions for those that possess nuclear weapons to verifiably eliminate their arsenals. Similarly, nations hosting any nuclear weapons can join the treaty, and establish a timeline for removal.

Fifty nations must ratify the treaty before it officially becomes international law by entering into force. As of July 5th, 2018 11 UN members states have ratified the TPNW, while 59 states have signed. At the time of the opening for signature of the Treaty, NATO released a statement^{xix} expressing concern that the new Treaty might jeopardize the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, more recent NATO articles reject this assertion, recognizing that the *'common denominator of both proponents and opponents of the TPNW is that their main goal is to strengthen the NPT'*.^{xx} Informally, NATO governments have suggested the TPNW would be incompatible with NATO membership.^{xxi} However, new research by the Harvard Law Review's Human Rights Clinic show that existing security agreements for NATO countries do not prevent NATO states from joining the TPNW.^{xxii}

In a similar vein, a 2014 study by the International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI) illustrated how NATO member states have, since the early days of NATO's creation, reserved the right to adopt independent national nuclear policies and to restrict their participation in nuclear weapon activities. Denmark, Spain and Norway do not allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime, while Iceland and Lithuania prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons in all circumstances. Iceland, Denmark and Norway also restrict port visits by nuclear-capable naval units. France, which has its own nuclear arsenal, does not participate in NATO's nuclear planning and does not assign any nuclear weapon to NATO. A precedent thus exists for NATO member states to restrict their participation in collective nuclear planning and sharing.^{xxiii}

Importantly, NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept also leaves room for interpretation. It does not promise to withdraw TNW from Europe but at the same time does also not include any language that would prevent such withdrawal. The notion *"broadest possible participation of Allies"* also makes explicitly clear that not every single NATO member state has an obligation to participate in NATO's nuclear posture. Finally, the description of *strategic* nuclear weapons as *"supreme guarantees of NATO's security"* in principle allows for a withdrawal of non-strategic weapons from Europe.

In April 2016 the debated a proposal for a national ban on nuclear weapons, supported by over 45.000 Dutch citizens. After this debate Dutch Parliament adopted four motions on nuclear disarmament, including one explicitly calling on the government to actively work for the start of negotiations on an international treaty banning nuclear weapons. During the 2016 UN General Assembly, the majority of political parties reaffirmed their support for the start of negotiations of a new legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons through a series of written Parliamentary questions.^{xxiv} **The Netherlands** participated in the negotiations on

the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, but was eventually the only country voting against the final text because the Treaty *'was not compatible with the obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a nuclear alliance'*.^{xxv}

In **Belgium** the current government has ruled out the possibility to sign and ratify the TPNW, citing concerns regarding NATO membership, verification measures and compatibility of the TPNW with the NPT. A June 2017 parliamentary motion asking the government to participate in the TPNW negotiations was voted down without debate. In a similar vein, a June 2018 motion asking the government to sign the treaty was also rejected by the coalition parties.

Civil society in **Germany** is very active in pressuring the government to join the TPNW. Even before the treaty was negotiated ICAN petitioned the government to take part in the negotiations and eventually received a negative reply from the incoming foreign minister Gabriel in February 2017. Sources from within the government say that this decision was very divisive. Moreover, the Social-Democrat SPD party was reportedly split on this issue. Since the completion of the treaty, however, the government line has been consistently negative and all attempts by the opposition to shift opinion through motions in the Bundestag have been simply voted down by the government coalition. An October 2017 petition that calls on the government to sign the TPNW has already reached 55,000 signatures.

In **Italy** the support for the TPNW coming from the civil society is strong, and helped by the Vatican position strongly supportive of the Treaty. Italian groups linked to ICAN are advocating for debate in the Parliament and are pressuring the Government to decide in compliance with the vast majority of Italian public opinion. During the previous Parliament (before general elections held in March 2018) more than 240 MPs signed the ICAN Parliamentary Pledge at the end of 2017. Since a new Parliament was elected there is now a new drive to collect signatures to the Pledge among the newly elected members.


2.2. What do citizens think?

Public opinion in all four host nations is strongly in favor of their country signing the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Support for signing the TPNW is most outspoken in Germany and Italy. In **Germany** 71 % want the government to sign the TPNW and in Italy 72 % of the population is in favor of the TPNW. In **Belgium** 66 % of the population wants the government to sign. In the Netherlands, 66 % of respondents are in favor of signing the TPNW.

QUESTION 2: In July 2017, 122 of 193 UN member states adopted a comprehensive new treaty that prohibits the development, possession, deployment and use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons states can join the treaty if they submit a time-bound and legally binding plan for the total elimination of their nuclear weapons arsenal. Do you think your country should sign the new UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons or not?

	My country should sign the TPNW	My country should not sign the TPNW	Don't know / prefer not to answer
Belgium	66%	14%	20%
Netherlands	66%	16%	18%
Germany	71%	13%	16%
Italy	72%	15%	13%

SIGN THE #NUCLEARBAN TREATY? YES PLEASE.



* Percentage of respondents from each country that felt their country **“should sign the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.”**

3. European private companies should disinvest from nuclear weapons producers

3.1. Background

70 European financial institutions are known to have significant investments in nuclear weapon producing companies. These investors assisted with share and bond issuances, owned or managed shares and bonds or outstanding loans or made credit facilities available to nuclear weapon producing companies between January 2014 and October 2017. The most heavily invested European financial institutions are BNP Paribas (France), Crédit Agricole (France) and Barclays (United Kingdom) with combined investments over \$24 billion.

Since the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in July 2017 two of the five largest pension funds in the world announced changes in their relationships with nuclear weapon producers. ABP, the fifth largest pension fund, announced that due to “[c]hanges in society, also at an international level... nuclear weapons no longer fit in with our sustainable and responsible investment policy.” Within the next year, ABP will make sure that nuclear weapon producers no longer have access to their \$500 billion asset pool (€405 billion). Another \$1,037 billion (€840 billion) are going to be kept out of more nuclear weapon producer hands, as the Norwegian Government Pension Fund (globally the 2nd largest pension fund) announced the first changes to the application of its nuclear weapon policy since 2013.

In addition, Belgian bank KBC announced it will exclude all nuclear weapon producers from its investment, while German Deutsche Bank also expanded its exclusion of nuclear weapon producers. KBC explicitly referred to the TPNW as the basis for its decision to exclude nuclear weapon producers: *“From now on, the Policy on Arms-Related Activities will also regard nuclear weapons as controversial weapons. Companies involved in the production or development of nuclear weapons will therefore be excluded from all KBC group activities. KBC is thereby following the line of the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which was endorsed by 122 countries on 7 July last year.”*^{xxvi}

3.2. What do citizens think?

Public opinion in all four host nations strongly rejects the idea that financial institutions operating in their country should invest in the nuclear weapon industry. In **Belgium** 68 % of the population does not want financial institutions to invest in nuclear weapons, while in the **Netherlands**, 71 % of public opinion is against the idea that financial institutions invest in nuclear weapons. In **Germany** and **Italy** respectively 72 and 78 % of respondents think it is not okay to invest in nuclear weapons.

QUESTION 3: Which of the following statements applies to you the most?

	I think it is okay when financial institutions in my country invest in companies engaged in nuclear weapons activities	I think it is not okay when financial institutions in my country invest in companies engaged in nuclear weapons activities	Don't know / prefer not to answer
Belgium	14%	68%	18%
Netherlands	15%	71%	14%
Germany	14%	72%	15%
Italy	11%	78%	11%

BANKS INVESTING IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS? THAT'S NOT OKAY.



* Percentage of respondents from each country that agreed with the statement "I think it is not okay when financial institutions in my country invest in companies engaged in nuclear weapons activities."

#DONTBANKONTHEBOMB

4. European countries should not buy Dual Capable Aircraft

4.1. Background

The B61 modernization programme will have direct consequences for European countries that currently host B61 gravity bombs and that maintain a dual-capable aircraft mission. In the words of US scientist Hans Kristensen: *‘Countries that host U.S. nuclear weapons and participate in the nuclear-sharing mission must, therefore, make or sustain decisions relating to costly replacement aircraft and the investments needed to retain the dual-capable aircraft (DCA) mission and nuclear weapons on their soil. **Those decisions will lock NATO into its current nuclear posture for the next several decades.***^{xxvii}

Currently, the American F-35A is scheduled to take over the DCA mission of existing DCA aircraft in European hosting states.^{xxviii} Most analysts agree that only the F-35 would be able to carry out a nuclear mission carrying the B61-12 nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. Although it would be technically possible to make other fighter jets like the Eurofighter or the Rafale dual capable (the latter already is), it seems highly unlikely that non-American companies would be willing to share industrial secrets with the US in order to receive the necessary nuclear certification.^{xxix}

Moreover, the **2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)** explicitly emphasizes the **key role that NATO Dual-Capable Aircraft will continue to play in US nuclear policy**. It states that the US is *‘committed to upgrading dual capable aircraft with the nuclear-capable F-35 aircraft’*, will work with NATO to *‘best ensure - and improve where needed - the readiness, survivability and operational effectiveness of dual capable aircraft based in Europe’*^{xxx}, and will *‘examine opportunities for additional allied burden sharing in the nuclear deterrence mission.’*^{xxxi} According to the NPR 2018 the US will closely cooperate with NATO allies to *‘enhance the readiness and survivability of NATO DCA’*, to *‘improve capabilities required to increase their operational effectiveness’*, to *‘promote the broadest possible participation of Allies in their agreed burden sharing arrangements regarding the DCA mission, nuclear mission support and nuclear infrastructure’*, and to *‘replace aging aircraft and weapons systems with modernized or life-extended equivalents.’*^{xxxii}

However, to date it is unclear when exactly the F-35A will become nuclear certified. A 2016 US Department of Defence review stated that the planning of the F35A program is *‘not executable’* and *‘unrealistic.’*^{xxxiii} According to a 2017 paper by Lt Col Richard Carver (US Air Force), the F-35 will not have DCA capability until around 2025.^{xxxiv} Moreover, it is unclear who will have to pay for the additional costs to make the fighter jets dual capable: the European host countries, NATO or the United States?^{xxxv}

Both the Netherlands and Italy have already decided to purchase F-35a aircraft. In **Italy**, the government decided to buy a total of 90 F-35s, including 60 F-35A fighter jets. It is estimated that 15-30 of these F-35A jets will be assigned to the nuclear mission.^{xxxvi} Public and political debate on a dual capability is however very limited. In Parliamentary debates on the purchase (before 2012) of new F35 JSFs, as new fighter jet replacements, some Resolutions were voted asking the Government to carefully consider the purchase the nuclear-capable version of F35, while most recent debates had binding Resolutions on the same matter rejected. In particular during April 2015, 80 Italian Senators demanded that the Italian government would not buy dual capable aircraft, pointing out that the allocation of the cost for the development of key components was unknown^{xxxvii}.

After a long public and political debate, the **Netherlands** decided to purchase 37 F-35As. In November 2013 the Dutch parliament passed a motion that demanded that the F-16 replacement should not have a nuclear mission.^{xxxviii} The Dutch government, however, has

since indicated that it does not feel bound by this motion.^{xxxix} In a written answer to parliamentary questions in June 2015, then Dutch Defence Minister Hennis-Plasschaert expressed her hope that by the time the F35 would be fully introduced in the Netherlands, NATO will have collectively renounced its commitment to the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe.^{xi}

Germany, on the other hand, is replacing its old PA-200 Tornados with Eurofighter jets but has not decided yet if it wants to make Eurofighter nuclear capable.^{xli} Lately there have also been reports that Germany is actively seeking nuclear certification for Eurofighter planes^{xlii}. It is, however deemed unlikely that the USA will provide this certification, making the issue of buying a new delivery system more urgent.

In **Belgium**, the government will decide in October 2018 on the type of fighter jet it wants to purchase. The 2017 Request for Government Proposals (RfGP) for new fighter jets does not specifically mention a dual capability requirement.^{xliii} The head of the procurement team within the Belgian ministry of Defence, however, has publicly declared that the RfGP does ask if ‘*in time, nuclear weapons can be added*’.^{xliiv} Several members of parliament of the current governing coalition have publicly stated they are not in favor of equipping new fighter jets with nuclear weapons. In contrast, current Foreign Minister Reynders has publicly argued in favor of Dual-Capable Aircraft. A February 2018 parliamentary motion that asked to not procure DCA was also voted down by the government coalition.

4.2. What do citizens think?

Public opinion in all four host nations also rejects the idea that new fighter jets should be equipped with a nuclear capacity. In Belgium and the **Netherlands**, a majority of those surveyed (respectively 44 % and 43%) do not want nuclear fighter jets. In **Germany** 55 % of respondents rule out a nuclear capability for new fighter jets and in **Italy**, 59 % of respondents are against a nuclear capacity.


QUESTION 4: Your government plans to buy new fighter jets for its military forces. Those fighter jets could be equipped with the capacity to transport and deliver the nuclear weapons that are stationed in your country. In regards to this situation, which of the following statements applies to you the most:

	I think the new fighter jets should be equipped with the capacity to carry nuclear weapons	I think the new fighter jets should not be equipped with the capacity to carry nuclear weapons	Don't know / prefer not to answer
Belgium	33%	44%	23%
Netherlands	39%	43%	17%
Germany	26%	55%	19%
Italy	23%	59%	19%

EQUIPPING NEW FIGHTER JETS TO CARRY NUCLEAR WEAPONS? NOT BUYING IT.

With the US modernizing its nuclear arsenal, European countries that host US nuclear weapons will have to buy expensive new fighter jets equipped with nuclear capacity.

Their citizens don't seem convinced.



5. Conclusion

On the first anniversary of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), this survey has found an overwhelming rejection of nuclear weapons.

The survey was conducted in the four EU countries that host US nuclear weapons: Belgium, Netherlands, Germany and Italy. **In each country, an overwhelming majority of the people surveyed was in favor of removing the weapons from their soil, and for their countries to sign the TPNW.**

The survey results show a clear rejection of nuclear weapons by those Europeans living closest to US nuclear weapons, and who are likely to be targets of any nuclear attack or at risk from any nuclear weapons accident. More than simply demonstrating a 'not in my back yard' mentality, Europeans are even more strongly in favor of a comprehensive ban of all nuclear weapons worldwide than simply removing the weapons from their own soil. It is clear that the people of Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands want to see their governments join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. NATO leaders should take into account these numbers and forge a new NATO security that rejects nuclear weapons, in line with the democratic wishes of their public opinion.

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